



**CSPRI SUBMISSION ON
CORRECTIONAL SERVICE
BUDGET VOTE (Vote 21,
2012/13), STRATEGIC
PLAN (2012/3-2016/7) AND
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE
PLAN (2012/13)**

Lukas Muntingh, Project Coordinator, Civil
Society Prison Reform Initiative, Community
Law Centre, University of the Western Cape,
te. 021-9592950 lmuntingh@uwc.ac.za

Contents

Introduction.....	2
Overview.....	3
Requirements in the Constitution and the Correctional Services Act.....	5
Safe custody.....	6
Programme specific comments.....	8
Administration.....	8
Incarceration.....	8
Rehabilitation.....	10
Social reintegration.....	12
Staff training.....	15
Questionable initiatives.....	15

Introduction

1. CSPRI wishes to thank the Committee for the opportunity to make a submission on the budget vote (2012/13), the Strategic Plan (2012/13 – 2016/17) and annual performance plan (2012/13) of the Department of Correctional Services (DCS). CSPRI welcomes a number of initiatives of the Department, with specific reference to the numerous infrastructure improvement projects (especially for female prisoners) and the scrapping of the proposed public private partnership prisons and.
2. While the budget vote and strategic plan address the macro-level developments in the Department, the proverbial devil is in the detail for it is here that the question must be asked if the operational decisions are indeed in pursuit of Constitutional and legislative objectives. This will be illustrated by way of example.
3. In 2009 the DCS purchased 900 electric stun belts at a cost of R2.7 million.¹ Internationally the use of stun belts has been criticised by human rights groups² and US jurisprudence has left only a narrow scope for its use.³ In 1997 the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Nigel Rodley, had already expressed deep concerns about the use of stun belts and other electroshock equipment.⁴ The UN Committee against Torture (CAT), in its concluding observations on the US's first report, recommended banning the use of stun belts as a method of restraining prisoners as "their use almost invariably leads to breaches of article 16⁵ of the Convention".⁶ Other electroshock equipment, such as riot shields, is also used by the DCS, and the Jali Commission was appalled by its use at Pretoria C-Max to inflict ritualised torture on new admissions to the prison.⁷ Against these findings, the purchasing of stun belts by the Department in 2009 appears to have been ill advised. The continued use of electroshock equipment

¹ 'Prisoners in for a shock' *IOL*, 9 February 2009, <http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/prisoners-in-for-a-shock-1.433834> Accessed 18 December 2011.

² Citing a report compiled by Amnesty International "The stun belt: Torture at the push of a button", World Socialist website, 19 June 1999, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jun1999/stun-j19.shtml> Accessed 18 December 2011.

³ *People v. Mar*, 02 S.O.S. 4412.

⁴ Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/38, E/CN.4/1998/38 para 193.

⁵ Article 16 prohibits other ill treatment that does not amount to torture.

⁶ UN Committee against Torture (2000) *Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: United States of America*. 15/05/2000. A/55/44, paras.175-180. (Concluding Observations/Comments) Para 180


⁷ Jali Commission, Vol. II Chapter 25.

in prisons poses significant risk for prisoners' right to be free from torture and other ill treatment and the purchasing of additional equipment was a retrogressive step, flagrantly disregarding guidance from the Special Rapporteur on Torture and a growing body of research on the topic.

4. When reviewing the budget vote and strategic plan it is therefore necessary to inquire into the detail of how particular targets will be met. The Strategic Plan and Annual Performance Plan are not as detailed as the Strategic Plans for previous years were and this limits the analysis to some extent.

Overview

5. According to the budget vote the estimated cost per day per prisoner in the two privately operated prisons will be R399 and this may sound expensive. However, the estimated cost for the DCS is R313 per prisoner per day or 21% less. It is by now common cause that the privately operated prisons provide far better services, engage prisoners for at least 12 hours a day in constructive activities and so forth. This is not to argue that private sector involvement is better, but rather to point out that the cost of the DCS prisons has grown considerably in recent years, but there has not been a concomitant improvement in services. It remains the case that most prisoners remain idle with little to engage them constructively. Unlike the situation in most African prison systems, financial resources are not a constraint in South Africa. The constraint appears to rather be one of performance and accountability.
6. In the programme descriptions on expenditure trends in the Budget Vote there is a repeated refrain to the effect that the increase in expenditure is primarily the result of increased expenditure in salaries, relating to the Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) and improvement in conditions of service. As shown in Figure 1 below, the compensation of employees will grow from R8.07 billion in 2008/9 to R13.05 billion by 2014/5. Proportionally, the compensation of employees reflects an increase from 63% to 65.6% from 2008/9 to 2014/5 of the total DCS budget. Moreover, the 2014/5 expenditure on compensation of employees will be nearly R5 billion more than the expenditure in 2008/9.



7. The above points out that future spending will to a large part be driven by the compensation of staff. Admittedly the DCS is bound by decisions made at the Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council. It can furthermore be concluded that DCS employees are well remunerated, since the majority (63.6%) of DCS employees earn an average annual salary of R253 197.⁸ Well remunerated civil servants should be regarded as good practice since it, at least theoretically, reduce the risk of corrupt acts and entitles the employer to demand good performance. This submission will argue that the emphasis should be placed on improving performance and ensuring that value for money is achieved.

8. Table 1 below shows the proportional distribution of the DCS budget for the period 2007/8 to 2014/5. From 2012/3 the Development and Facilities programmes are apparently incorporated into the other programmes. As a result, the Security Programme now constitutes 53% of the budget and together with Administration, these two programmes account for 81% of the 2012/3 budget. On the other hand, the Care Programme's share will decline from 11.2% to 8.8% and the Social Reintegration programme's share will increase marginally by 0.7% to 4.2% of the budget.

⁸ DCS Annual Report 2010/11 p. 199.

Table 1 Proportional distribution of DCS budget 2007/8 to 2014/5

PROGRAMME	2007/8	2008/9	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/3	2013/4	2014/5
Admin	25.7	25.9	25.7	26.6	26.9	27.8	28.4	28.3
Security/Incarceration	33.6	35.5	35.3	34.0	33.8	53.3	53.1	53.3
Corrections/Rehabilitation	8.2	8.0	9.2	9.6	9.3	5.5	5.4	5.4
Care	11.4	10.5	11.3	11.5	11.2	9.2	8.9	8.8
Development	3.3	3.5	3.2	3.7	3.4			
Social reintegration	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.5	4.2	4.2	4.2
Facilities	14.6	13.3	11.9	11.0	12.0			
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

9. The overall impression gained from the projected expenditure trends is that very limited funding is aimed at supporting offenders once released despite the fact that the period immediately after release is critical for reducing the risk of re-offending.
10. This submission will critically examine proposed spending priorities against planned and existing results. More specifically, it will attempt to assess whether spending priorities are aligned with the requirements in the Constitution and the Correctional Services Act.

Requirements in the Constitution and the Correctional Services Act

11. The Constitution in section 35(2)(e) is explicit in respect of conditions of detention and states that

“Everyone who is detained, including every sentenced prisoner, has the right (e) to conditions of detention that are consistent with human dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment”.

In very simple and practical terms this means that all prisoners have a right not be detained in overcrowded facilities with dilapidated infrastructure, to have access to a library or similar facility, proper meals and proper medical treatment. These are the minimum requirements in respect of conditions of detention and they are enshrined in

the Constitution. The Correctional Services Act, specifically in Chapter 3 (Part A), operationalizes these rights. Ensuring strict compliance with these requirements is the responsibility of the Department's management at all levels. Complying with these prescripts should be the primary focus of the Department.

12. When assessing the plans and budget votes of the Department the point of departure should therefore be: are the basic rights of prisoners, as described in the Constitution and the Correctional Services Act, being complied with? Once this can be answered in the affirmative with reference to each and every prison, other initiatives not required by the Constitution and the Correctional Services Act can be undertaken. Fundamentally, this requires strict and sustained compliance with the Correctional Services Act before more creative and elaborate activities could be undertaken.
13. Such a process of interrogation can therefore be guided by a number of questions:
 - Is the planned activity or expenditure a Constitutional requirement, or does it serve a Constitutional requirement?
 - Is the planned activity or expenditure a requirement of the Correctional Services Act, or does it serve a requirement in the Correctional Services Act?
 - Will the planned activity or expenditure be to the detriment or at the cost of a requirement in the Correctional Services Act?

Safe custody

14. The most recent Annual Report reflects that during 2010/11 there were 317 assaults per 10 000 prisoners reported,⁹ compared to the figure for the previous year of 137 per 10 000.¹⁰ This is a more than 200% increase in the number of assaults. The figures are reported as aggregates and it is therefore not clear how many of these assaults were the result of inter-prisoner violence and how many were assaults committed by officials on prisoners. Regardless of this, the number of assaults indicates a level of violence that is unacceptably high and questions need to be raised about the ability of

⁹ DCS Annual Report 2010/11, p. 47.

¹⁰ DCS Annual Report 2009/10, p. 64.

the Department to ensure the safety of prisoners. It is furthermore extremely worrying that the number of assaults had increased sharply in such a short period.

15. In view of this trend the question must therefore be asked whether the budget vote and strategic plan pays particular attention to this problem. The Strategic Plan sets targets for the coming years, indicating that the assaults will decline from the current level of 317/10 000 at a rate of 20 per year to reach a level of 160/10 000 by 2016/7.¹¹ From the Strategic Plan it is not clear how the Department will achieve this. There is no information presented in the Strategic Plan that, for example, indicates that DCS officials would undergo human rights law training with specific reference to the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment for Prisoners and the UN Convention against Torture. In the light of the recent *McCullum* decision and the high number of assaults by officials on prisoners, it is evident that the assault and torture of prisoners is not a problem of isolated incidents but rather a systemic problem. In its submission to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services on 30 November 2011 on the prevalence of torture, CSPRI expressed its concern regarding the high number of unnatural deaths in custody. Even more worrisome was that, at the time, that not a single official had been prosecuted where implicated. This fosters a culture of impunity in the Department.

16. Note is also taken of the amount of R988 million in contingent liabilities in the financial statements for “Bodily Injury/Assault”.¹² Human rights violations have very real financial implications and the DCS should have a clear strategy in place to reduce its exposure to such claims. CSPRI would in principle support initiatives reflected in the strategic plan and budget vote that would reduce the number of unnatural deaths and the number of assaults on prisoners. The right to be free from torture and other ill treatment is a non-derogable right and the DCS should reflect this in its plans and budget.

17. It is therefore submitted that the DCS should in its strategic plan set out what proactive and reactive steps will be undertaken taken to reduce the number of assaults and unnatural deaths in custody. Examples in this regard include, but are not limited

¹¹ Strategic Plan p. 19.

¹² DCS Annual Report 2009/10 p. 190.

to, developing a policy on the prevention and eradication of torture, the training of staff on the absolute prohibition of torture and other ill treatment as required by article 10 of the UNCAT, the review of policies, practices and procedures to prevent the torture and ill treatment of prisoners as required by Article 11 of UNCAT, the prompt and impartial investigation of allegations of torture and ill treatment as required by Article 12 of UNCAT, the prosecution of perpetrators of torture as required by Article 7(1) of UNCAT, and the establishment of an effective complaints mechanism as required by Article 13 of UNCAT.

Programme specific comments

Administration

18. It is noted from the budget vote (p. 10) that expenditure on consultant services will decrease from R139 million to R128 million. This will be mainly in relation to information technology (IT). While this is welcomed, it should be noted that this is still more than double the expenditure in 2008/9; R60 million. The Department has spent considerable amounts of public funding on IT in recent years, yet problems persist with even the most basic functionalities, such as e-mail and internet access.¹³

19. The Annual Performance Plan (p. 18) notes that 56.4% of financial services and related posts are vacant. Such a high vacancy rate not only creates production problems, but also places the Department at significant risk of financial mismanagement and maladministration. Indeed, much of what has been achieved in recent years in improving governance and administration may be undone if this situation is not addressed as matter of urgency.

Incarceration

20. The annual performance plan notes that the White Paper on Remand Detention was “consulted”. To the best of our knowledge, civil society has not been consulted nor has the White Paper been tabled in Parliament for comment. We submit that the

¹³ PMG Report on the meeting of SCOPA of 28 November 2011.

Committee seeks clarification from the Department in this regard and establish what steps are being planned to consult stakeholders.

21. The budget vote notes that the Department intends to reduce the average length of time that awaiting trial prisoners remain in custody. CSPRI wholeheartedly supports this aim. However, relying on section 63A of the Criminal Procedure Act to achieve this does not hold much promise as it has not worked in the past and is unlikely to deliver the desired results in the future.¹⁴

22. As noted previously by CSPRI, the Correctional Matters Amendment Act (5 of 2011), in section 49G stipulates that the period of incarceration of a remand detainee cannot exceed two years "from the initial date of admission without such matter having been brought to the attention of the court." The Head of Centre will also be required to report to the National Prosecuting Authority at six-monthly intervals on cases involving remand detainees who have been held for successive six month periods. In the event that detention continues, the Head of Centre must bring such cases before the court on an annual basis. The proposed mechanism, even if a step in the right direction, remains weak and will serve only as a monitoring mechanism.¹⁵ Furthermore, the amendment sets out the procedure to bring an accused before a court, but it does not explain what the court must do. The court may indeed end up postponing a case for a further six months without interrogating the reasons for the delay, as provided for in section 342A of the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977).

23. In order to be effective, limiting the duration of pre-trial detention should be regulated in the Criminal Procedure Act and not in the Correctional Services Act. The decision to remand a person to prison awaiting trial is made by the courts which are governed by the Criminal Procedure Act. It is through this legislation that time limits and a mandatory review mechanism should be created.

¹⁴ Office of the Inspecting Judge (2009) *Annual Report of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services 2008/9*, Cape Town: Office of the Inspecting Judge, p. 10.

¹⁵ Muntingh, L. and Ballard, C. (2011 a) Correctional Matters Amendment Bill (41 of 2010), *CSPRI Newsletter*, No. 38, June 2011.

24. The budget vote (p. 10) provides for the establishment of seven schools for youth offenders. CSPRI supports this fully and regards access to education as a key outcome for the Department. However, given the severe lack of educational facilities in the Department this seems to be an extremely modest target. Attention is also drawn to the requirement in the Correctional Services Act that all children of compulsory school-going age¹⁶ must have access to education; this includes both sentenced and unsentenced children.¹⁷ CSPRI's research has established that the Department does not comply with this requirement. The planned schools should therefore at minimum ensure that all children of compulsory school-going age have access to education.
25. On page 11 of the budget vote reference is made to the establishment of a remand detention branch at a cost of R45 million. It is not clear what these funds will be spent on. It is furthermore outlined that the awaiting trial population will be decreased from 47 861 to 46 283, or by 1578. In effect this reduction will thus cost R28 517 per prisoner. While CSPRI is supportive of any measure aimed at reducing the use and duration of pre-trial detention, this seems to be excessive. We submit that the Committee seeks clarification from the Department in this regard.

Rehabilitation

26. Section 38(2) of the Correctional Services Act requires that only prisoners serving sentences of longer than 24 months have a sentence plan. In an earlier submission CSPRI has noted that the majority of sentenced prisoners admitted and thus released have served sentences of less than 24 months. The net result is that nearly two thirds of the Department's mandate do not have sentence plans and are consequently denied access to the services that should arise from such a plan. In the final analysis the Department's contribution to a safer society should be measured against its out-put, namely former prisoners who re-enter society successfully and are able to reintegrate. As it stands now, the majority of the output is excluded from the services that should prepare them for re-entry and reintegration. This remains a serious shortcoming in the legislation and strategy.

¹⁶ According to the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996, schooling is compulsory for all South Africans from the age of seven (grade 1) to the age of 15, or the completion of grade 9.

¹⁷ S 19(1)(a).

27. In respect of reducing illiteracy (p. 13 of the budget vote) it is proposed to establish a baseline and reduce this by 2% per year. CSPRI supports this, but calls for a far more aggressive approach. It is CSPRI's submission that improving the literacy levels of all prisoners, regardless of their sentence length and status is a basic and fundamental service that the DCS should provide. Since awaiting trial prisoners are in custody for an average of 177 days (nearly six months), this is considerable time period that can be used to render literacy services to illiterate prisoners.
28. Access to education has also been demonstrated to be the only scientifically proven measure to reduce violence in prisons. Research findings lend solid and overwhelming support for providing prisoners with academic and vocational training programmes as a means to reduce violence and disorder in prisons. McCorkle et al report on a study of 317 U.S. state prisons where it was found that, "[E]ven after controlling for other institutional characteristics, prisons in which a large percentage of the prisoner population was involved in educational, vocational, and prison industry programs reported lower rates of violence against inmates and staff."¹⁸ The same authors recommend that order in the prison was best achieved when prisoners were engaged in meaningful programmes that offered opportunities for self-improvement and not just a structured day-programme that kept prisoners busy. According to McCorkle et al meaningful programmes create something valuable that prisoners prefer not to lose through a violent incident: "To an inmate participating in such a programme, the immediate costs of aggression may be judged to [be] high: falling behind in the programme, the loss of an industry job, and the transfer to a more custody oriented prison. Participants in meaningful programmes would also be looking forward to release, and with new skills acquired, the chance of a fresh start. Weighed in the balance with their dreams, the momentary satisfaction derived from an act of violence would likely be discounted".¹⁹ The pervasive idleness and long lock-up periods characterizing South African prison life may then indeed be one the major risks to safe custody.
29. The existing and planned results in respect of Offender Development (budget vote p. 14) are very modest. In this regard particular attention is paid to skills development,

¹⁸ McCorkle, R., Miethe, T., & Drass, K. (1995). The Roots of Prison Violence: a test of the deprivation, management, and "not so total" institution models. *Crime and Delinquency*, 41 (3), 325.

¹⁹ McCorkle, R., Miethe, T., & Drass, K. (1995). The Roots of Prison Violence: a test of the deprivation, management, and "not so total" institution models. *Crime and Delinquency*, 41 (3), 328.

such as technical training, education and agricultural production. In many regards this refers to acquiring new technical competencies that would equip former prisoners to become economically active after release. It is reported that there were only 4301 out of 7058 eligible prisoners in skills development. Seen against the total group of prisoners serving sentences of longer than 24 months (100 676 as at Feb 2011), they represent a mere 4.2%. It is implausible to assert that only 7000 out of 100 000 prisoners were eligible for skills development. The opposite is more likely to be correct: there are very few sentenced prisoners who would not benefit from skills development.

30. The prison system will continue to produce mediocre results unless the Department is willing to invest aggressively in improving the literacy, skills and education levels of sentenced prisoners. With little over 5% of the budget spent on rehabilitation, it is hardly surprising that less than 5% of the sentenced population is involved in skills development.

Social reintegration

31. As noted in Table 1, the Social Reintegration Programme will receive 4.2% of the budget. The period after release is extremely important in reducing re-offending, especially when offenders are on parole and under correctional supervision. Every month an estimated 4000 prisoners are released, but there is nothing in the strategic plan for the next five years indicating how the DCS will support released prisoners with re-entry. The performance indicators deal with victim participation in parole boards, the functioning of the Case Management Committees (CMC), a pilot project halfway house, the number of cases referred to the Correctional Supervision and Parole Review Board, implementing the medical parole provisions, the development of a restorative justice policy document, the number of parole violations, and electronic monitoring.
32. The Strategic Plan is therefore silent on the real needs of released prisoners, namely employment, access to services, skills training and education. There is indeed little sense in investing in in-prison services to reduce re-offending when there are no post-release support services.

33. Table 2 below summarises the sub-programmes of the Social Reintegration programme (budget vote p. 19) indicating that (excluding the office accommodation sub-programme budget) 92% of the budget is allocated towards the remuneration of staff. The bulk of this is spent on the Supervision sub-programme where the 1815 officials supervise an average case load of 37 609 parolees and probationers, or roughly 21 parolees and probationers per official. At least at face value this appears to be a manageable case load and there is nothing in the Strategic Plan or budget vote indicating the contrary.

Table 2 Social reintegration programme budget

Sub-programme	Budget	Nr of staff	Percentage to be spent on staff remuneration
Parole administration	R100.4 million	90	94.3%
Supervision	R557.1 million	1815	91.9%
Community reintegration	R26.6 million	73	88.8%

34. The question arising from this assessment is whether useful support services are being rendered to parolees and probationers that would assist them with their re-entry and reintegration? There is no information in the strategic plan and budget vote that clarifies this. The challenges that returning former prisoners face are well known and are summarised below:²⁰

- *Personal issues facing returning prisoners:* Returning prisoners confront a range of personal issues that jeopardize their chances of succeeding in the community and reoffending. Substance abuse, mental illness, lack of accommodation, being HIV-positive or having Aids, being unemployed and having low educational qualifications are some personal challenges faced by released prisoners.
- *Impact of prisoner re-entry on families:* Returning parents have to resume or start assuming the role of parent in a family set-up that often faces significant challenges. Families may in themselves experience deep-seated problems and

²⁰ Baer, D. et al (2006) *Understanding the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry: Research Findings from the Urban Institute's Prisoner Reentry Portfolio*, Urban Institute, Washington, p. 1

therefore have great difficulty in accepting a family member or parent that has been in prisons. The incarceration of a parent remains an important indicator for future delinquency amongst children.

- *Impact of prisoner re-entry on communities:* There is increasing evidence that certain communities and indeed certain families contribute disproportionately to the prison population and that high incarceration communities are destabilized in a variety of ways.²¹ The net effect is large numbers of predominantly young men circulating through the prison system on a continuous basis from these communities.
- *Challenges to prisoner re-entry:* ‘Returning prisoners confront a number of challenges that make it difficult for them to gain access to jobs, benefits, or services that might assist in their transition back into the community’. Unlike the USA, there are few barriers in South Africa that legally exclude released prisoners from state assistance, but poor support services, uncoordinated services or absence of services to released prisoners and their families remain a significant problem.²²

35. The Social Reintegration programme requires re-conceptualisation to ensure that the Department directs resources to assist parolees and probationers to reduce the risk of re-offending. At present it appears that parole has been reduced to a policing function and that little other support services are being rendered.

36. Conceivably the Department can render such services in cooperation with other governmental and non-governmental agencies, but unless it is in the strategic plan and the budget, there should not be any expectation that it will indeed happen in practice. There are a number of non-governmental organisations rendering post-release service, but they do so without any financial support from the Department. The focus of the Social Reintegration programme requires serious re-thinking to ensure that it addresses the needs of released offenders and reduce their risk of re-offending.

²¹ Clear, T. (2007) *Imprisoning Communities – How mass incarceration makes disadvantaged neighbourhoods worse*, Oxford University press, New York.

²² Social, Economic and Workforce Programs Division (2004) *The Challenges and Impacts of Prisoner Reentry*, NGA Centre for Best Practices, <http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/REENTRYBACKGROUND.pdf>

Staff training

37. Table 21B of the budget vote (p. 21) presents a summary of expenditure on staff training. The Adjusted Appropriation for 2011/12 states that R110.9 million will be spent on training 17 044 employees (or R6510 per capita). Given the current staff establishment (approximately 41 000), it is also the case that less 42% of the Department's employees will undergo any training in the 2011/12 financial year.
38. The Department is facing tremendous transformation challenges and it is inconceivable how its officials can deliver on the radically changed strategic plan (after 2004) if there is not a continuous training programme targeting all staff at least on an annual basis to ensure that they understand what is expected from them and how to perform their job functions optimally. It is unrealistic to expect officials to implement the strategic goals of the Department if they are not skilled to do so.

Questionable initiatives

39. The Annual Performance Plan (p. 10) notes under the Outputs "Perceptions of crime among the population managed". Little information is provided on the exact nature of activities, but it appears that it relates to the public's perception of the DCS and that the intention is to improve this. The next output in the Annual Performance Plan (p. 11) "Percentage of stories that convey favourable DCS image" seems misdirected given the enormous problems the Department is facing relating to rights violations, deaths in custody, corruption and so forth. If resources are to be spent on this, it raises questions about prioritisation. Improving conditions of detention and ensuring safe and humane custody are more important than how the public views the Department and whether the media reports in favourable terms on the Department. Ultimately, it is the Department's achievements or failures that will determine its reputation.
40. The Annual Performance Plan (p. 14) describes the Department's planned activities regarding the African Correctional Services Association (ACSA). While regional cooperation is important and laudable, clarification should be sought on whether this output is being undertaken at the cost of other more deserving and immediate problems.

41. The Annual Performance Plan (p. 24) refers to an inmate tracking system to be developed. The cost of the inmate tracking system is not explained in the budget vote but this could be considerable. Again this raises questions about the importance of such a project relative to other more pressing problems. High-tech solutions have a history of failures in the Department (e.g. the biometric security system) and have not demonstrated their effectiveness. We submit that such proposals should be considered with caution.
42. The Annual Performance Plan (p. 25) notes the creation of new office space for the DCS Head Office and the Budget Vote (p. 25) allocates R3 million to site identification. The estimated construction cost is not indicated. In view of other more pressing problems regarding detention conditions and the treatment of prisoners, the need for new Head Office space must be questioned.

End.